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THROUGH THE PRUNEYARD
COHERENTLY: RESOLVING THE
COLLISION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND NONEMPLOYEE
UNION ACCESS CLAIMS
HARRY G. HUTCHISON*
And all shall be well and
All manner of things shall be well
By the purification of the motive
In the ground of our beseeching.
Quick now, here, now, always-
A condition of complete simplicity
(Costing not less than everything)
And all shall be well and
All manner of things shall be well
When the tongues of flame are in-folded
Into the learned knot of fire
And the fire and the rose are one.1
I. INTRODUCION
As one observer notes: "The persistent tension between private or-
dering and government regulation exists in virtually every area known to
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Kay, James Fair, Stephen Mazurak, Pamela Lysaght, Joan Hutchison, Richard Myers, Bernard
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Clint Bolick, George Leef, Linda Ross, and James Bond.
The usual caveat applies. The author wishes to thank the University of Detroit Mercy,
School of Law for financial assistance as well as to thank Richard Rockwood, Enrique Griffin,
and Sister Colleen Hickey for invaluable research assistance.
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the law, and in none has that tension been more pronounced than in the
law of employer and employee relations."' One area of labor law that
remains much debated and analyzed concerns the interstices of nonem-
ployee union access and private property. At issue is whether labor un-
ions, which are the beneficiaries of statutory monopoly power that
allows them to wield market power and to influence wages and other
terms of employment,3 should be granted expanded access to private
property, especially in an organizational/recognitional campaign context.
For example, the question may be whether a union can recruit members
on a business's property.
Nonemployee access has been the subject of numerous National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions and is a theme discussed in over
a dozen law review articles. Some observers claim that courts, bound by
unwritten and unarticulated assumptions and values,4 have engaged in
2. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
3. MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER 3 (1987).
4. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUEs AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2 (1983).
Atleson states: "[I]t seems clear that many judicial and administrative decisions are based
upon other, often unarticulated, values and assumptions .... The belief in the inherent rights
of property and the need for capital mobility, for instance, underlie certain rules .... Id.
Moreover, he asserts that these values are hidden but determinative in many cases. Id at 3.
Among the otherwise hidden values and assumptions in his view are:
1) The "inherent right of management to maintain production despite the serious im-
pact upon statutory rights." Id. at 7.
2) "[T]hat employees, unless controlled, will act irresponsibly." Id. at 7. This raises a
concern that greater employee freedom leads to anarchy. Id. at 7-8.
3) "[T]he limited status of employees" (while the NLRA only defines employer re-
strictions, employee restrictions stem from the courts acceptance of the inferior rights
of employees). Id. at 8. This results in deference to the superior status of employers
and limits the scope of permissible concerted behavior by employees.
4) "[T]he 'common enterprise' is primarily under management's control," which "leads
to an important focus on the workplace as the property of the employer." Id. at 8. How
this works out in a property concept is explained later in this Article. See a at 60-63.
Among the criticisms proffered by Atleson is the claim that, "in those areas in which property
notions are preeminent, such as solicitation on company property, the [United States
Supreme] Court seems confused between some notion of inherent, absolute property rights
and rights to manage the enterprise which inhere in possession." Id. at 60; see also James B.
Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REv. 841 (1985); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REv. 305 (1994); Jay
Gresham, Note, Still as Strangers: Non-employee Union Organizers on Private Commercial
Property, 62 TEx. L. Rv. 111 (1983); Sarah Korn, Note, Property Rights and Job Security:
Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee Union Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374 (1984). The view
exemplified by critics of the NLRB and the courts likely reflects "a widely accepted proposi-
tion that large corporations now pose a threat to individual freedom comparable to that which
would be posed if government power were unchecked." Epstein, supra note 2, at 949 (citing
Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1404 (1967)).
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constrained decisions and statutory interpretations of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA) 5 that preclude or unwisely limit access to
private property by nonemployee union organizations in violation of
Section 7 guarantees.6 These limits are seen by some observers as a con-
tributing factor in the decline in union membership, power, and influ-
ence. 7  Consequently, the otherwise inevitable and highly desirable
movement towards "workplace democracy" has been impaired by
archaic judicial and statutory property definitions.8 Others assert that
5. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
69 (1988)). Sections 7 and 8 of the original NLRA are codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158
respectively.
6. See Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for
Legal Reform, 38 CAT-. U. L. REv. 1 (1988). Klare asserts that an "area long overdue for
reform is the question of access to and use of the workplace for employee self-organization
and concerted activity." Id. at 45. In particular, nonemployee union organizers should be
guaranteed some access to the workplace so that employees may have at least minimal oppor-
tunities to learn about collective bargaining. Id.
Existing cases recognize that the workplace is the natural locus of work-related com-
munication, and that '[t]he right of self-organization depends in some measure on the
ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others.' Deci-
sionmakers should give life to these basic democratic principles in interpreting existing
rules and entitlements.
Id. at 46 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,113 (1956)). But see Richard
A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, in ECONOMaC LmERTIEs AND
=rm JuDICIARY 39 (James A. Dorn & Henry Manne eds., 1987); Roger Pilon, Legislative Ac-
tivism, Judicial Activism, and the Decline of Private Sovereignty, in EcoNomic LIBERTIES AND
rHm JUDICIARY 183 (James A. Dorn & Henry Manne eds., 1987). Pilon argues that both the
legislative and judicial branches of government animated more by policy than principle have
eviscerated individual rights and property rights in a manner unimagined by the founders. Id.
at 183-92.
7. See Lee Troy & Neil Sheflin, Going Public: New Unionism on the Rise, DEr. NEws,
Sept. 6, 1992, at 3B. "Less than 12 percent of the [United States] private sector is unionized
down from a peak of 36% in 1953." This percentage is less than union penetration in 1929. Id.
See generally RIcHARD B. MCKENziE, COMPETING VISIONS: TIm POLITICAL CONFLICr OVER
AMEIuCA's ECONOM C Fu-ruR (1985) (offering an excellent exposition of the views of labor,
intellectual, and business leaders who seek to change the future by realigning in a fundamental
way public and private decision making in the United States predicated on expanded worker
and union rights).
8. See Kare, supra note 6, at 17. Klare explicates the goal of expanding and enhancing
"democracy". This article seems premised on, among other things, the asserted need for ex-
pansive market reconstruction. The author proceeds to engage in a flawed attempt to expli-
cate the myths of the free market. For instance, he correctly points out that a market system,
at a minimum, assumes a law of property, contracts, and torts. Id. at 20. Then he claims to
have discovered incoherence between the notion of a free market and a market free from
regulation. Id. at 21. In essence, Klare criticizes the free market for not being completely free.
This, of course, ignores the fact that all defenders of the free market accept a limited govern-
ment. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 953-55. Importantly, Klare concedes that incidents of
property ownership, such as what one can do with it, or what one can prevent others from
doing with it significantly affect the property's value. See Klare, supra note 6, at 20; see also
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limited nonemployee, nonpatron access to private property (especially
shopping malls) outside of the explicit parameters of labor law unneces-
sarily chills political expression9 and precludes the "uninhibited robust
ATLESON, supra note 4, at 62 ("[Flederal law does not protect property or the right to exclude
but only the right to compensation when property is 'taken' by the state for some public
purpose, pursuant to due process and under its power of eminent domain").
In addition, it should perhaps be noted that many critics of the current balance of power
between labor and management may be collectivists who "by the very nature of their creed,
wish to control and limit the workings of markets. [I]t is assumed that since for a long time
now the tendency has been for governments to try to control the economy [or incidents of
private property] and to limit the extent of free markets, there is something quixotic, reaction-
ary, or positively wicked in the idea of trying to move in the opposite direction." H.B. Acton,
The Theme of the Essay, in Tim MoRALs OF MARKETS AND RELATED ESSAYS 24 (David
Gordon & Jeremy Shearmur eds., 1993). If Acton's view is correct, it is unsurprising that the
free market is likely to be subjected to incoherent attacks by critics of the current balance of
power between labor and management. But see Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Polit-
ical Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633 (1991); Clyde W. Summers, The Priva-
tization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons From Labor
Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 689, 690 (1986) (explaining that the values of free speech are no
less if exercised in a shopping mall rather than in a company town). Summers objects to
rigorous line drawing between state action and private action in constitutional adjudication as
this line is largely irrelevant. Furthermore, he claims that to respect private property in the
face of the demand of political expression constitutes a denial of personal freedom. Id. at 689-
93. While this claim possesses a surface appeal, other observers persuasively argue for a
rather strict distinction between private as opposed to state action with respect to property.
See Wesley J. Liebeler, A Property Rights Approach to Judicial Decision Making, in Eco-
NOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 153 (James A. Dom & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
But see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945) (the Court seems to
accept some inconvenience and even some property right dislocation in order to safeguard the
right to collective bargaining).
9. Berger, supra note 8, at 636; see also Mare, supra note 6, at 23. Klare attempts to
create, ex-nihilo, "a vigorous and systematic program of egalitarian market reconstruction
aimed at enhancing direct workplace participation and worker self-realization opportunities."
Klare, supra note, at 23. He seeks to expand the reconstruction logic of the New Deal labor
law system beyond its self-imposed limits to an approach which seeks to systematically mobil-
ize democracy on "every aspect of employment relations." Id. at 41. For instance, as a first
start down the road of progress, Klare suggests that NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105 (1956) and its progeny should be overruled. Id. at 45-46. In Klare's view, the employer's
common law ownership rights must give way in the face of transparently superior competing
statutory rights of employees. Id. at 26. In essence, property ownership is to be redefined so
that employer ownership rights are more limited than they were under pre-existing common
law.
For an incisive view that economic and property rights deserve expanded protection, see
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SuPREmE COURT'S CONSTITUTION (1987). Seigan eloquently con-
tends that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence fails to implement existing [property] rights.
Id. at 81. See also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND Tm CONSTITUTION 320
(1980) (contending that "judicial withdrawal from the protection of economic activity [includ-
ing private property rights] violates Article III of the United States Constitution"). For an
argument that voluntary, as opposed to regulated, exchange promotes social welfare, see
JAMEs D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
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and wide open" debate that is a precondition for a vital, free, and par-
ticipatory society.10 Curtailing political expression, it is averred, by "de-
fining 'public forum' ever more restrictively only serves to 'underscore
the privatism of our social lives' and weakens the fabric of a par-
ticipatory society."'"
However poignant these claims may be, the United States Supreme
Court, in its Lechmere v. NLRB decision,'2 has seemingly revitalized the
legal doctrine first articulated in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,' 3
which rather sharply limited nonemployee union access to property held
in private hands. This doctrine can be stated as follows: Despite the fact
that the employees' right of self-organization depends in some measure
on their ability to ascertain the advantages of self-organization from
others, the NLRA "[b]y its plain terms confers rights on only employees,
not on unions or their nonemployee organizers.' ' 4
In Lechmere, a Connecticut retailer established and consistently en-
forced a no solicitation/no access rule. The rule barred all types of solici-
tation. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCWU)
commenced an organizing campaign by running a newspaper advertise-
ment aimed at Lechmere's employees. Then the UFCWU began a series
of trespasses into the store and onto the parking lot to distribute hand-
bills. The employer ejected the organizers from the store and parking
lot. In response, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging
the ejections violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The NLRB applied
a balancing test and held that the ejections were unlawful.'"
The Supreme Court disagreed. Instead, it explicitly rejected the
NLRB's attempt to balance the union's difficulty in reaching employees
against the employer's private property interest and held that the NLRB
impermissibly expanded nonemployee union access rights beyond the
limits imposed by Babcock & Wilcox. In Lechmere, the Court reiterated
the view that nonemployee organizers need not be accommodated by
employers unless the workplace is otherwise inaccessible.' 6
EcoNoMIcs AND PROSPERrrY (1993)(available at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 119
Ashman Street, P.O. Box 568, Midland, Michigan, 48640).
10. Berger, supra note 8, at 637.
11. Id. at 647 (quoting BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 306 (1984)).
12. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
13. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
14. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845.
15. Id. at 844.
16. Id. at 849-50. For an article criticizing the Court's decision, see Estlund, supra note 4.
Among other things, the author states that the Court allowed the employer's "naked property
1994]
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In light of (1) the Lechmere decision, (2) the Pruneyard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins decision' 7 and its progeny, and (3) the Supreme Court's
invitation to states to interpret or adapt, either judicially or legislatively,
their own constitutions'8 to insure freedom of expression on private
lands, it is a propitious time to examine the collision of nonemployee
access and private property definitions from a public choice
perspective.' 9
Public choice theory has been aptly summarized by one distinguished
observer who, while discussing Wicksell, the progenitor of the public
choice school, stated that
[t]he relevant difference between markets and politics does not lie
in the kinds of values/interests that persons pursue, but in the
conditions under which they pursue their various interests. Poli-
tics is a structure of complex exchange among individuals, a struc-
ture within which persons seek to secure collectively their own
privately defined objectives that cannot be efficiently secured
through simple market exchanges.2 °
Another public choice commentator avers the following:
From a historical perspective, at least the two ideas of private
property and a free society were thought to be so intimately con-
nected as to be all but equivalent. Property rights, it was be-
lieved, both enable and describe our freedom, just as the free
society is the society defined by property rights that define in turn
the relationships between the individuals who constitute the
society.2'
In essence, there are two theories of property: the traditional theory of
classical liberalism and the new theory which sees an inevitable opposi-
tion between private property and a free society.22 This new theory,
right to trump the substantial statutory interests of organized employees in spreading informa-
tion about and seeking support for unionization." Id. at 308.
17. 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also William J. Brennan Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 535
(1986).
18. Brennan, supra note 17, at 550.
19. See PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (James D. Gwartney & Rich-
ard E. Wagner eds., 1988). For an accessible explication of public choice theory, see DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE; A CRmCAL INTRODUCTION
(1991).
20. James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 103, 107-08 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds.,
1988).
21. Roger Pilon, Property Rights, Takings and a Free Society, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 151, 154 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988).
22. Id. at 155.
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which emanates like penumbras from cases such as Pruneyard and from
commentators within and outside of the labor law nonemployee access
nexus, has undeniable attractiveness. Some observers, on the other
hand, have said that if this theory is adopted by our law and legal institu-
tions, society must encounter the risk of "error, confusion and
disorder." 3
In this paper, I consider the acceptance, by a number of states and
commentators, of the invitation to discount property rights while ex-
tending greater personal expression rights to citizens in light of the non-
discrimination provision of Section 8 of the NLRA 4 and federal
preemption issues.25 First, based on a review of pertinent United States
Supreme Court opinions, an analysis of hypothetical cases, and consider-
ation of recent NLRB decisionmaking, I explore the likelihood of confu-
sion, disorder, and incoherence. I conclude that, given the likelihood of
confusion and disorder in cases involving nonemployee union or-
ganizers, amended federal preemption rules should explicitly preclude
state-sponsored expansions of personal expression rights. Second, in
light of the fact that such expansions favor narrow special interests as
opposed to the larger interest, and given the inevitability of conflict be-
tween property owners' rights and access claims by nonemployees, I ar-
gue that a return to a principled view of private property rights,26 which
expands the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dolan v. City of
Tigard2 by disallowing uncompensated takings, is warranted as a vehicle
for insuring coherence in the Pruneyard.
II. Tim NLRA AND NONEMPLOYEE AccEss To PR1VATE PROPERTY
A. Nonemployee Access and the NLRA Nondiscrimination
Requirement
Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right to organize, form,
join, or assist a labor organization, as well as the right to bargain collec-
23. Id.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
25. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC-
TiVE BARGAINING, 766-86 (1976) (presenting at least one view of federal preemption). See
also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Garmon suggests,
among other things, that the refusal of the National Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdic-
tion did not leave the state with power over activities it would otherwise be preempted from
regulating. Id. at 238.
26. For an elegant example of principled analysis which examines the collision of property
rights and the First Amendment, see Liebeler, supra note 8, at 167-74.
27. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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tively. 8 In addition, Section 8(a)(1) provides in pertinent part that "[i]t
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
[S]ection [7].' ' 9 Furthermore, access discrimination with respect to so-
licitation and distribution of organizing union literature gives rise to an
unfair labor practice charge. The parameters of union access depend im-
portantly on whether the organizers are employees or nonemployees.
Access rules have been set forth in a number of cases.
For instance, the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Stowe
Spinning Co.3" held that the National Labor Relations Board could
properly find that an employer commits an unfair labor practice violat-
ing Section 8(1) of the NLRA when the employer discriminates against a
labor organization by denying use of a company-owned meeting hall (the
only such hall in town), to a nonemployee union organizer, while freely
giving other groups the right to use the facility. The Court upheld the
NLRB's finding that the sole purpose of the employer's discriminatory
denial was to impede, prevent, and discourage self-organization and col-
lective bargaining by the company's employees within the meaning of
Section 7 of the NLRA.3
While suggesting it could be argued that the NLRB's determination
went further than prior decisions, the Supreme Court said, in a larger
sense, that the Board did not in fact exceed earlier legal determina-
tions.32 Moreover, the Court suggested that there is a difference be-
tween a company-dominated mill town and a vast metropolitan center in
which a number of halls exist within easy reach of prospective union
members,33 thus giving rise to a stronger access claim in the former case
than in the latter. The Court reaffirmed precedent 34 and said that not
every interference with property rights constitutes a violation of the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 35 To the contrary, the Court stated
that inconvenience or dislocation of property rights may be necessary in
order to preserve collective bargaining rights.3 6 In the context of a com-
pany-dominated town, the Court decided, the act of discrimination itself
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
29. Id. § 158(1).
30. 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
31. Id. at 233.
32. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 230.
34. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
35. Stowe, 336 U.S. at 232.
36. Id.
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constitutes an unfair labor practice. 7 Accordingly, the property owners
should be precluded from treating the union application to use the com-
pany-owned hall, run by a company-dominated fraternal order, any dif-
ferently from applications for nonunion groups or individuals. In other
words, giving access to nonunion groups but not to union organizers is
discriminatory, illegal, and in violation of the NLRA.
In Priced-Less Discount Foods,38 the Board adopted the trial exam-
iner's decision, which held that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the NLRA by 1) threatening to have a union organizer arrested, and 2)
causing him to be arrested on the company's parking lot in the presence
of employees, despite the fact that he was engaged in organizing activi-
ties with employees during their own time.39 At the time of his arrest,
the union organizer had been receiving union cards from employees and
talking to employees about joining the union.40 He had not distributed
any literature.41 By contrast, the store owner had permitted the high
school, junior high school, and other organizations to solicit on the com-
pany's parking lot.42 Accordingly, the trial examiner held that the em-
ployer "discriminated against the union in denying it access to its
parking lot while permitting the public and approved groups such ac-
cess," despite its no solicitation notice.43
In general, "the Board and courts have found it necessary to accom-
modate the employees' interest in maximum access to union communi-
cations with the employer's interest in the security of his property during
working hours."" Employers may promulgate rules limiting employee
solicitations or constraining the dissemination of literature on company
property.45 However, as the Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB4 case
states, a no-solicitation rule, even one adopted long before the advent of
a union and even where it has been applied in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner, can be a violation of Section 8(a)(1),47 which prohibits employers
from restraining, interfering, or coercing employees who are rightfully
on private property.
37. Id. at 233.
38. 162 N.L.R.B. 872 (1967).
39. Id. at 873-74.
40. Id. at 873.
41. Id. at 874.
42. Id. at 875.
43. Id
44. GoRmAN, supra note 25, at 179.
45. Id.
46. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
47. GoRmAN, supra note 25, at 179-80 (citing Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. 793).
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, when the union organizers are not employees,
and are not therefore rightfully on private property, the Board and the
courts are disinclined to grant access to private property unless discrimi-
nation is present.' Consistent with Babcock & Wilcox, the Supreme
Court has held that employer/property-owner, no-solicitation, no-distri-
bution rules, when applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, are valid
against nonemployees "if reasonable efforts [made] by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable the
[union] to reach employees with [the] message."49 In Babcock & Wilcox,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a substantive distinc-
tion exists between employees and nonemployees.5 0  As subsequent
cases illustrate,5 1 "even though employer resistance, or difficulties of ge-
ography or work scheduling, render extremely unlikely the success of
requesting address lists or bulletin board space or [of] meetings off com-
.pany property.., the union must pursue such avenues of communica-
tion-at least as a prerequisite to securing an order permitting access to
company property."5"
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,53 the United States Supreme Court rein-
vigorated its holding in Babcock & Wilcox. Consistent with Babcock &
Wilcox, the Court held that nonemployee union access rights need not be
accommodated unless the workplace is otherwise inaccessible. 4 It is im-
portant to note that the employer, by failing to grant access, did not dis-
criminate against the union organizers in favor of other groups.
48. Id. at 185; see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); see also Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 n.10 (1976) (explaining the distinction between employee orga-
nizational and nonemployee organizational access to private property).
49. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 185 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112). Note
that Justice Powell has placed importance on the fact that in Babcock & Wilcox the organizers
were not employees and were therefore trespassers, whereas the employees in Republic Avia-
tion were not trespassing and therefore allowed to solicit. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113;
see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 n.10 (1976).
50. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113.
51. See NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012
(1972) (upholding no-solicitation rules despite remote employer with living, dining, and recre-
ational facilities on premises, but the court emphasized union's failure to attempt to contact
employees by less intrusive means). See also NLRB v. Kutsher's Hotel and Country Club,
Inc., 427 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1970) (upholding no-solicitation rules despite failure to communi-
cate through local newspaper advertisement or at the main gate). See also GORMAN, supra
note 25, at 186.
52. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 186.
53. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
54. Id. at 850. It should be noted that Justice White vigorously dissented. He argues that
the court should "uphold a Board rule so long as it is rational and consistent with the Act,....
even if we would have formulated a different rule." Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB
v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990)).
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In Lechmere, Local 919 of the UFCWU endeavored to organize em-
ployees at a Newington, Connecticut store, which is owned and operated
by the petitioner, Lechmere, Inc. 55 The store is in the Lechmere Shop-
ping Plaza.
Lechmere's store is situated at the Plaza's south end, with the
main parking lot to its north. A strip of [thirteen] smaller 'satel-
lite stores' not owned by Lechmere runs along the west side of the
Plaza, facing the parking lot.... [A] [forty-six]-foot-wide grassy
strip, broken only by the plaza's entrance, [abuts the plaza park-
ing lot].... The grassy strip is public property (except for a four-
foot-wide band adjoining the parking lot, which belongs to
Lechmere).
The [labor] union began its campaign to organize the store's
200 employees, none of whom was represented by a union, in
June 1987. After a full-page advertisement in a local newspaper
drew little response, nonemployee union organizers entered
Lechmere's parking lot and began distributing handbills on the
windshields of cars which were parked in a comer of the lot, most
used by Lechmere employees.56
Almost immediately, Lechmere's manager confronted the organizers
and informed them of Lechmere's no-solicitation, no-handbill distribu-
tion policy.57The organizers were asked to leave and they did so. How-
ever, "the union organizers renewed this handbilling effort in the
parking lot on several subsequent occasions;"' 8 each time, upon request,
they left. Later, "the organizers... relocated to the public grassy strip,
from where they attempted to pass out handbills to cars entering the lot
during hours before opening and after closing."' 59 Furthermore, the
union organizers returned to the grassy strip during business hours to
picket Lechmere; "after that, they picketed intermittently for another six
months. ' 60 In addition, the organizers "recorded the license plate num-
bers of cars parked in the employee parking area" and were able to as-
certain "the names and addresses of some forty-one nonsupervisory
employees. The union sent four mailings to these employees '61 and
made additional efforts "to contact them by phone or home visits."62 As
55. Id. at 843.
56. Id. at 843-44.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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a result of these organizational efforts, only one signed union authoriza-
tion card was received.63
Given this rather clear failure to organize, the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board. The
union alleged that Lechmere's policy, which barred nonemployee or-
ganizers, constrained employee Section 7 rights. Both the administrative
law judge and the NLRB held for the union.' Relying on Jean Coun-
try,65 the NLRB adopted the recommended order. The First Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals, though divided, refused Lechmere's
petition for review and chose to enforce the NLRB's order.66
To the contrary, relying on its analysis in Babcock & Wilcox, the
United States Supreme Court held that Lechmere did not commit an
unfair labor practice by barring nonemployee union organizers from the
property for the following reasons: 1) "By its plain terms,... the NLRA
confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployees
organizers. '67 Thus, as a rule, an employer cannot be compelled to allow
nonemployee organizers onto his property; 2) At least as applied to non-
employee union organizers, pursuant to Babcock & Wilcox, Section 7
does not protect nonemployee union organizers except in the rare case
in which" 'the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reason-
able attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the
usual channels;' "68 and 3) The facts do not justify the Babcock & Wilcox
inaccessibility exception.69 In essence, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
conclusion that the Babcock & Wilcox exception is a very narrow one.70
In light of the narrowness of this exception, nonemployee union or-
ganizers have focused on other avenues to maintain access claims to pri-
vate property.
B. Access Claims under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution
As one commentator points out, in response "to [a] rather sharp limi-
tation upon non-employee solicitation, unions have developed yet an-
other access argument: that many forms of solicitation on company
63. Id.
64. Id. at 844-45.
65. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
66. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 848 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)).
69. Id. at 849; see Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988.)
70. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849.
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property are protected by the free speech provisions of the federal Con-
stitution."' 71 As urban centers fragment and economic life increasingly
disperses throughout suburbia, it becomes extremely difficult to solicit
employees. Accordingly, unions have increasingly pointed to the public
attributes of private property surrounding targeted economic establish-
ments72 which, they claim, give rise to constitutionally protected access
rights.
This poignant cry for constitutional access was vindicated in Amalga-
mated Food Employees Union Local 590 1'. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.73
The United States Supreme Court held that picketing by nonemployee
union organizers at a freely accessible shopping center is a constitution-
ally protected labor activity.74 In this case, a nonunion supermarket was
located in a shopping center complex, the Logan Valley Mall. The super-
market in issue, Weis Markets, was granted an injunction to protect its
property rights from the picketers. The injunction was premised on a
trespass claim. Since the picketing took place within a mall to which the
public had unrestricted access, the Supreme Court disagreed and held
that labor picketing at this privately owned mall could not be enjoined.75
This constitutionalizing of nonemployee access claims was rather
short-lived. First, in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,76 a union solicited
employees outside a hardware store that was located within a rather
large building surrounded by a parking lot, which was owned by the
store owner and used by nonemployees and customers.77 The Supreme
Court declined to vindicate the nonemployee union organizers' constitu-
tional claims. Instead, the case was remanded to ascertain whether the
solicitation was protected by virtue of Section 7 of the NLRA.78 The
Court held that an employer could not be subjected to the limitations of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments unless the property had assumed
"to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property
devoted to public use."' 79 The Court concluded that the property in is-
71. GonmAN, supra note 25, at 187; see also Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech:
The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4 (1984).
72. GoRMAN, supra note 25, at 187.
73. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled in part by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
74. Id. at 315; see also GoRmAN, supra note 25, at 188.
75. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 325.
76. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
77. Id. at 540-41.
78. Id. at 548.
79. Id. at 547.
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sue, a parking lot open to the public, failed to take on the attributes of
public property, thus eviscerating nonemployee union access claims.80
Shortly after this decision, and animated by its belief in the right of
employers to control their private property, the Supreme Court over-
ruled Logan Valley. In Hudgens v. NLRB,81 employees working at the
Butler shoe store warehouse went on strike and picketed the company's
retail stores, which were located elsewhere. One of these stores was lo-
cated inside of an enclosed mall. Because the shopping mall owner
threatened arrest for trespassing, the union filed a charge under Section
8(a)(1).82 Overruling the interpretation of both the NLRB and the court
of appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the shopping
mall was not a governmental entity for purposes of the United States
Constitution's protection of freedom of speech. Accordingly, the picket-
ers had no constitutional right to be free from arrest for trespass. The
Court decided that constitutional protection was available against pri-
vate property holders only when the property assumed all of the attrib-
utes of a municipality, such as post offices, streets, or sewers.8 3 On
remand, the Board was to determine the picketers' rights under Section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA solely in light of the picketers' status as employees
picketing their own employer, rather than as individuals seeking to exer-
cise constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression of rights.'
In sum, it seems clear that, with the possible exception of so-called
company towns, "the right of employees and nonemployees to solicit on
company property can no longer plausibly be based on the federal Con-
stitution."'85 To the contrary, it "must instead be based upon an analysis
of the Labor Act and an accommodation between the Section 7 rights of
workers and the property rights of employers.
8 6
C. Federal Preemption
Some commentators suggest that state law constitutes a ground on
which access claims should rest.87 Implicitly, such a view challenges the
conclusion that nonemployee labor rights are to be governed exclusively
80. Id.
81. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
82. Id. at 510.
83. Id. at 521.
84. Id. at 523.
85. GoRmAN, supra note 25, at 189.
86. Id.
87. Berger, supra note 8, at 636.
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by the NLRA. To access this view, a brief exegesis of federal preemp-
tion of state regulations is in order.
"The most common form of governmental regulation of labor-man-
agement disputes until 1935 was state-court relief by injunction or dam-
ages against concerted activities .... ."I The United States Supreme
Court, in a number of "unclear if not inconsistent"8 9 decisions, has per-
vasively preempted state regulation of concerted activities by employees
as set forth in Gannon90 and sustained in subsequent decisions.91 For
instance, the Supreme Court has concluded that a "state could neither
enjoin nor award damages against minority-union picketing designed to
induce an employer to enter into a union shop agreement against the
wishes of its employees." 92 "The rationale for preemption... rests in
large measure upon our determination that when it set down a federal
labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the
then prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure funda-
mentally the processes for effectuating that policy .... "9 While "there
has been a strong strain in Supreme Court opinions, almost uniformly in
concurring or dissenting opinions," 94 which argues for a limited form of
preemption that accepts some state remedies.95 A majority on the Court
embraces a more expansive form of preemption,96 which precludes most
state remedies.
In cases involving picketing,' the Supreme Court, under the um-
brella terms of "arguably protected" under Section 7 or "arguably pro-
88. GORmAN, supra note 25, at 766.
89. Id.
90. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In two earlier cases,
Garner and Weber,
each union's conduct arguably violated section 8(b) of the Act, [and] the complaining
employer could test the propriety of the union's activities by filing a charge with the
NLRB. No such opportunity is available, however, when the union's conduct does not
involve an arguable section 8(b) violation and the union contends that its conduct is
protected by the section 7 of the Act.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BOARD, THE CoURTs AND THE NATIONAL RELATIONS
Acr 1662 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed., 1992) (referring to Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 363
U.S. 485 (1953), and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955)).
91. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274 (1971).
92. GoRMAN, supra note 25, at 766.
93. Amalgamated, 403 U.S. at 288.
94. GoRmAN, supra note 25, at 768.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. To be sure, picketing is a term capable of several meanings. Pursuant to Section 8
(b)(7) of the NLRA, there is no consistent distinction between organizational, publicity and
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hibited" under Section 8, trumps state regulation of conduct 98 when
nonemployees picket for organizational purposes because such activity
falls within the arguably protected category. Hence, federal preemption
of state law seems available.99
Again, consider Hudgens v. NLRB. 100 There, striking employees at
the warehouse of the Butler shoe company engaged in picketing at one
of the Butler retail outlets located in an enclosed shopping mall and op-
erated under the terms of a lease.101 Although the strikers had no con-
stitutional right to picket, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
Board determination of whether the right to picket on the privately
owned mall property was statutorily protected against the owner's tres-
pass claim by Section 7 of the NLRA.' ° Invoking the Babcock & Wil-
cox balancing test, the Board said that the status of picketing employees
entitles "them to at least as much protection as would be afforded to
nonemployee organizers.' °3 Furthermore, the distinctions between
Babcock & Wilcox and Hudgens were not dispositive. First, Hudgens
involved lawful economic strikers' activity rather than union organiza-
tional activity; second, the Section 7 authority in Hudgens was carried
out by employees of Butler, a mall lessee; and third, "the property rights
impinged upon [in Hudgens] were not those of the employer against
whom the [section] 7 activity was directed, but of another."'" "In sum,
the issue... is whether ... the threat by Hudgens' agent.., to cause the
arrest of Butler's warehouse employees engaged in picketing Butler's re-
tail outlet in Hudgen's shopping center ... violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.' 0 5 Premised on the view that employees of employers doing
area standards picketing. Conceptually, "recognitional picketing is picketing to induce an em-
ployer to recognize a union as the bargaining representative of [the] employees." DOUGLAS
L. LESLIE, LABOR LAw, IN A NUSHELL 71 (3d ed., 1992). Recognitional picketing can be an
unfair labor practice 1) where the employer has lawfully recognized another union; 2) where
within the preceding one year period, a valid election has been conducted; and 3) where orga-
nizational picketing continues in excess of a 30 day period without an election petition being
filed. Publicity picketing involves advising the public that an employer does not employ mem-
bers of, or have a contract with a union. Area standards picketing involves a union demand
that the employer pay union wages. Confusingly, "area standards" picketing can have a
recognitional purpose.
98. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 770.
99. Id. at 771.
100. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
101. Id. at 509.
102. Id. at 523.
103. Scott Hudgens and Local 315, Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union, 230
N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977).
104. Id. at 417.
105. Id. at 415.
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business in shopping malls are to be afforded the full protection of the
NLRA, the Board affirmed its conclusion that the mall owner, by threat-
ening to cause the arrest of picketing strikers, violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the NLRA.1 6 Accordingly, "a strong case can be made that such picket-
ing falls within the Garmon principle, and that preemption should
operate.' 10 7
On the other hand, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
Dist. Council of Carpenters,'8 the Supreme Court held that "arguable
Section 7 claims" 10 9 do not preempt deployment of state trespass law in
protection of private property, in large part because the trespasses of
nonemployee union organizers are more likely to be unprotected than
protected. 110
Finding that there existed a significant state interest in the protec-
tion 11 of its citizens and that the challenged conduct could be the sub-
ject of an unfair labor practice charge, the Court concluded that there is
"little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the
[NLRB]." 1 2 Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to preempt the ap-
plication of state trespass law which regulated the locus of the picketing,
despite the claim that the picketing was both arguably prohibited under
Section 8 and protected under Section 7. Conceivably, it might have
been prohibited as a jurisdictional dispute or as recognitional picketing,
and it might have been protected as picketing for area standards. In
106. Id. at 418.
107. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 775.
108. 436 U.S. 180 (1978); see also Riesbeck Food Markets, Inc. v. United Food and Com-
mercial Workers, Local Union 23, 404 S.E. 2d 404 (W. VA. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169
(1991) (state court jurisdiction preempted over informational picketing by union as an activity
arguably protected by NLRA).
109. In reality, the Court considered at least two alternative perspectives on the picketing
in issue: 1) "The union had engaged in arguably prohibited recognitional picketing subject to
Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act which could not continue for more than 30 days without peti-
tioning for a representation election." Sears, 436 U.S. at 184. 2) The picketing could arguably
be protected by § 7 because it was intended to secure work for union members and to publi-
cize the fact that Sears was undercutting the prevailing wage area standards of carpenters. Id.
In addition, "the legality of the picketing was unclear. IWo separate theories would support
an argument by Sears that the picketing was prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA, and a third
theory would support an argument by the Union that the picketing was protected by § 7." Id.
at 185.
110. Id. at 205. "To gain access, [in nonemployee cases], the union has the burden of
showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to the
employees exists or that the employer's access rules discriminate against union solicitation....
[T]he burden imposed on the union is a heavy one.. . ." Id.
111. Id. at 196.
112. Id.
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sum, despite "the potential for conflict presented in Sears, the Court re-
fused to preempt the state court proceeding. It viewed the 'primary ju-
risdiction' rationale of Garmon, which requires adjudication in the first
instance by the Board, as relatively unimportant,""' 3 especially where
the injured party does not have "a reasonable opportunity either to in-
voke the Board's jurisdiction or else to induce his adversary to do so.""' 4
The Court believed that the union was not disadvantaged by state re-
strictions and that the union had the opportunity to fie unfair labor
practice charges against the employer for its trespass action; further, the
employer, Sears Roebuck, could neither invoke the Board's jurisdiction,
nor compel or induce the union to do so. Consequently, preemption of
state remedies was not allowed." 5
In Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Committee,"6 the Supreme Court deployed a preemption
doctrine that required respect for economic weapons as part of the free
play of economnic forces envisioned by the NLRA. The Court believed
that this area was consciously left free of regulation by Congress and,
accordingly, state regulation of conduct which the NLRA neither pro-
tects nor prohibits is preempted." 7
While this case has been the subject of some criticism,"' the Machin-
ists doctrine was applied in Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton"9 to
disallow the application of a West Virginia statute immunizing labor ac-
113. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 90, at 1680.
114. Id; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
599 P.2d 676 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980) (holding found that picketing was
lawful under state law).
115. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 90, at 1680. In reality, the Court might
hold that state court action is preempted "unless, prior to bringing the state court action, the
employer threatens the union with state court or state police action. This [threat] provides the
basis for the union to file an unfair labor practice charge against the employer. "Absent such
a threat, the Board might be without jurisdiction since the Board has held that an employer's
resort to state court action does not violate Section 8(a)(1)." LESLM, supra note 97, at 318.
But see Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc. 475 U.S. 282
(1986) (holding that the NLRA preempts Wisconsin Statute which debars firms that have
violated the NLRA three times within a 5-year period from doing business with the State
premised on the view that states are not allowed to provide their own remedies for conduct
prohibited or arguably prohibited by the NLRA). See also Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120,494 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 512 N.W.2d
881 (Minn. 1994).
116. 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (disallowing a state injunction against a collective refusal to work
overtime); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 90, at 1654-97.
117. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 147.
118. See Estlund, supra note 4, at 341-42.
119. 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991).
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tivity from state trespass laws. 120 Accordingly, "[u]nder the Fourth Cir-
cuit's Rum Creek analysis, the Machinists doctrine-designed to restrict
state intervention in labor disputes-effectively gives employers a fed-
eral right to demand state intervention (i.e., a right to call upon police to
eject striking employees), even if state law does not recognize that
right."'1 21 Despite the argument that such a view has no grounding in the
text of the NLRA, 12 preclusions of state-created remedies in an area
that the NLRA neither protects nor prohibits remains an additional
prong of federal preemption.
In sum, while the doctrine of federal preemption of state labor regu-
lation is subject to some articulated rules, determining when preemption
can be invoked remains an unclear and perplexing question. If an indus-
try affects commerce, even if the NLRB declines to exercise jurisdiction,
federal preemption of state jurisdiction seems quite possible.'23
III. PRUNEYARD AND ITS PROGENY: AN INVITATION ACCEPTED
A) California
In March 1979, the Supreme Court of California, in Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center,"4 held that the distribution of literature
and the soliciting of signatures on a petition to the government was an
activity protected by the California Constitution. The shopping center in
question attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons and "consist[ed] of
approximately twenty-one acres-5 devoted to parking and 16 acres oc-
cupied by walkways, plazas, and buildings that contain[ed] sixty-five
shops, ten restaurants, and a cinema."' 25 Assuredly, "[t]he public is in-
vited to visit for the purpose of patronizing the many businesses.' 26
High school students, in contravention of Pruneyard's policy precluding
any tenant or visitor from engaging in publicly expressive activity, circu-
lated petitions that were not directly related to the commercial purposes
for which the mall is held open. The students solicited signatures in sup-
port of their opposition to a United Nations resolution against
Zionism.' 27
The California Supreme Court considered two main questions:
120. Id.
121. Estlund, supra note 4, at 342.
122. Id
123. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 90, at 1654-97.
124. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
125. 1d at 342.
126. 1d
127. Id
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(1) Did Lloyd Corp. v. Tannerl 8 recognize federally protected
property rights of such a nature that the Court was barred from
ruling that the California Constitution creates broader speech
rights within its definition of private property than does the fed-
eral Constitution?
(2) "[D]oes the California Constitution protect speech and peti-
tioning at shopping centers?"1- 9
In answer to the first question, the California Supreme Court over-
ruled its prior holding in Diamond v. Bland.3 ° Instead, citing with favor
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,'3 ' the court said, "Members of the public are
rightfully on Pruneyard's premises because the mall is held open to the
public during shopping hours." 3' Accordingly, Lloyd, viewed in con-
junction with other pertinent labor law cases,'133 "does not preclude law-
making in California which requires that shopping center owners permit
expressive activity on their property."'" 'Additionally, premised on the
"public interest"'35 shibboleth, the court averred that "'[a]ll private
property is held subject to the power of the government to regulate its
use for the public welfare.' "36
Once Lloyd and federal constitutional inhibitions were dismissed, it
was a rather tiny step to expand the California constitutional provisions
at issue beyond their text'37 and protect solicitation of petition signa-
128. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
129. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 343.
130. 521 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
131. 437 U.S. 556 (1978). This case involved an interpretation of the NLRA and whether
there is a statutory basis for protecting employees' right to distribute a four-part newsletter
that contained two parts related to organizational request and two parts related to political
expression. Consistent with earlier cases, the Eastex court held that the employees were right-
fully on the employer's premises in order to perform the duties of employment, and if there
was in fact an intrusion, it did not vary with the content of the materials being distributed. Id.
132. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 344. A related issue is, the determination of how property
rights are created. Some interpreters of Babcock & Wilcox contend that while Babcock &
Wilcox explicitly states that the national government preserves property rights, property rights
are not created by the federal government but by the states. See Bristol Farms, 311 N.L.R.B.
437, 438 (1993).
133. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 344.
134. Id.
135. Public interest, to be sure, is a term incapable of precise meaning. But whatever it
means, it seems to trump "mere" property interest. See ELLEN F. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTs
AND EMINENT DOMAIN 185-93 (1987) (indicating that a state may sacrifice one private inter-
est for another private interest once the latter has been shrouded in the guise of the public
interest).
136. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 344 (quoting Agriculture Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior
Court, 546 P.2d 687, 694 (1976)).
137. Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution reads: "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
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tures on private property by vitiating an important property right: the
right to exclude. The court held that Article I, sections 2 and 3 of the
California Constitution prevent the enjoining of signature gatherers,
even when the center is privately owned. 138
As the dissent noted, the majority opinion conspicuously ignored the
trial court's determinations that:
1) Numerous alternative public fora existed for purposes of sig-
nature gathering;
2) The plaintiffs made no attempt to avail themselves of these
channels;
3) As a matter of law, there had been no dedication of the
center's property to public use and the center was not the "func-
tional equivalent" of a municipality.139
The dissent stated that "supremacy principles would prevent us from em-
ploying state constitutional provisions to defeat defendant's federal con-
stitutional rights."'1 Furthermore, the dissent said that the majority
erred in adopting an "excessively narrow reading of Lloyd.' 41 In Lloyd,
the United States Supreme Court admonished that "[i]t would be an un-
warranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the
exercise of the First Amendment rights under circumstances where ade-
quate alternative avenues of communication exist."'142
While the majority may have unmistakably erred, its opinion was af-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court. In Pruneyard,43 the Court
held that its reasoning in Lloyd did not control the instant case. First,
Lloyd did not "limit a state's authority to exercise its police power or its
sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."'" Second,
the distribution of literature and the allowance of solicitation of signa-
tures on privately owned property in the exercise of state-protected
rights of free expression does not constitute an unconstitutional tak-
ing.' 45 The Court stated that appellants had failed "to demonstrate that
the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value
of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 2 (a).
138. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 347.
139. Id. at 348 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 349 (quoting Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d 460, 463 n.4 (Cal. 1974)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
144. Id. at 81.
145. 1I at 83.
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of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a
'taking.' "1146
To be sure, the Court conceded: 1) "[p]roperty does not lose its pri-
vate character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for
designated purposes;" 147 2) property does not change its essentially pri-
vate character "by virtue of being large or clustered with others
stores;" 148 and 3) that "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of prop-
erty rights is the right to exclude others. '149
However, relying on Armstrong v. United States,' 50 the Court stated
that it is also "well established that 'not every destruction... has been
held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense.' "1151 To the contrary, a
claimed violation of the Takings Clause requires a determination of
whether the restriction on private property requires some individuals or
entities to bear alone "public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.' 5  In reviewing the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's rendering of its constitution, no unreasonable in-
fringement of private property was found. Hence, the appeal failed. 53
In sum, none of the United States Supreme Court Justices voted to
uphold the property owner's claims. To the contrary, the Court decided
that there was not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 54 The latter decision was reached despite the Court's explicit
conclusion that there had in fact been a taking of one of the essential
sticks in the bundle of property rights: the right to exclude others. In
effect, the Supreme Court extended to state courts and legislatures an
open, undefined invitation to expand freedom of expression rights be-
yond the parameters of merely public property or public fora. The right
to exclude others from private lands can be snatched without compensa-
146. Id. at 84. But see Klare, supra note 6, at 20 (conceding that what a property owner
can do with his property or what the owner can prevent others from doing with it significantly
affects the property's value).
147. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81.
148. It
149. kd at 82.
150. 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
151. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82 (quoting Annstrong, 364 U.S. at 48).
152. 1& at 83 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
153. Id at 84. The Supreme Court did allow the property owner to restrict expressive
activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations. Id. at 83. For an argument that the
Rehnquist opinion fails to offer a coherent account of incidents of ownerships, including ex-
clusive possession, and that the entire matter of investment-backed expectations does not go
to the takings issue, see RicHARD A. EPSTIN, TAKINGS 65 (1985).
154. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84.
155. Id at 82.
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tion as long as the snatcher does so reasonably. Consequently, it is not
surprising that at least a few states and many commentators have ac-
cepted this offer.
B. Other States
The invitation presented in the prior subsection has been concep-
tually advanced by a number of writers who urge states to abridge prop-
erty interests in response to the imprecatory call of "democracy." As
one observer put it, "sensitive citizens" responding to the call should not
countenance the decision in Lloyd denying relief to five members of a
resistance community from a shopping center owner who barred distri-
bution of anti-war handbills.'56 Another writer explicitly questioned
whether ownership rights exist in real property at all.' 57 Property rights,
we are told, must give way in the face of competing and transparently
superior First Amendment or labor rights claims.158 Still others have
suggested that what is self-evidently required is the development of an
extra-constitutional view of what constitutes a public forum, 159 premised
essentially on state-law grounds.160 At least twenty state courts have
wrestled with the knotty issues involved in nonemployee, nonpatron ac-
cess to private property.' 61 Most of the state decisions, whether
156. Summers, supra note 8, at 689-90. In addition, one observer claims that the Sears
decision itself "would seem to leave the states free to define property rights more narrowly,
thereby expanding access rights beyond the minimum set by the NLRA." Estlund, supra note
4, at 340.
157. Klare, supra note 6, at 47.
158. Id. at 48-49.
159. Berger, supra note 8, at 659-78.
160. Id at 661.
161. The question of nonpatron, nonemployee access to private property has been an
issue in a number of opinions. A number of states have held that their state freedom of
expression rights protect expression against private enforcement of property rights. See Bock
v. Westminister Mall, 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d
341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, (N.J. 1980), appeal
dismissed sub nom, Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 445 U.S. 100 (1982); State v. Cargill, 786 P.2d
208 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 851 P.2d 1141 (1993); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445
N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the Middle East v. J.M.B.
Realty, 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981); State v.
Dameron, 853 P.2d 1285 (Or. 1993); see also In re Lane, 457 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1969) (upholding
the right of a labor union to handbill on a privately owned sidewalk in front of a grocery
store).
On the other hand, an even larger number of states reject state freedom of expression
claims. See State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1991) (upholding conviction of nonemploy-
ees who distributed handbills urging consumer boycott of restaurant because its owner em-
ployed nonunion building contractors at another location); Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 469
A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984); Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assoc., 392 S.E.2d
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favorable or unfavorable to freedom of expression claims, have ad-
dressed the Pruneyard issue under their respective constitutions. 16 De-
spite the attractiveness of the imprecatory demand for expanded access,
it is also clear that most states that have considered these issues have
rendered unfavorable decisions to individuals and groups seeking
speech-related access. 63
In light of the demand for expanded access, it is useful to look at a
few decisions which favor expanded access. Illustrative of favorable
state court decisions granting speech or petition-related access to private
property outside of a labor context are State v. Cargill'6 and Batchelder
v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc.1 6 5 In each of these cases, individuals sought
access for purposes of gathering signatures. In addition, in Batchelder
the individual also sought to distribute literature. 166 In both cases, the
state court held that there is a state constitutional right to gather signa-
tures at either a large store and parking lot or at a mall. 67 These forms
of property become, in effect, public fora for purposes of freedom of
expression analysis.
In Cargill, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that there is an im-
plicit right that "people must have adequate opportunities to sign...
petitions.' 68 Accordingly, it held that where the store and parking lot
are open to the public and citizens are invited to come and congregate
on the premises, the store and parking lot become a forum for assembly
by the community, despite the company's policy precluding petitioners
on its property, unless there is evidence that the petitioners' activities
substantially interfere with the store owner's use of the property. 69 In
light of current societal habits to congregate at stores and malls, the Car-
gill court then adapted its state constitution to preclude prosecuting peo-
8 (Ga. 1990); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985); SHAD
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708
(N.C. 1981); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987); Johnson v. Tait, 774
P.2d 185 (Alaska 1989); Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P2d 1282
(Wash. 1989); see also Berger, supra note 8, at 634; William B. Harvey, Private Restraint of
Expressive Freedom: A Post-Pruneyard Assessment, 69 B.U. L. REv. 929 (1989).
162. Berger, supra note 8, at 634.
163. Id. at 634.
164. 786 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 851 P.2d 1141 (1993).
165. 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983).
166. Id. at 591.
167. Id. at 595; Cargill, 786 P.2d at 214.
168. Cargill, 786 P.2d at 211.
169. Id. at 212-14.
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ple "in areas that have replaced traditional forums for the collection of
signatures. 170
In Batchelder, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
solicitors have a right to solicit nominating signatures and distribute as-
sociated materials in a reasonable and unobtrusive manner in the com-
mon areas of a large shopping mall.171 This decision was premised on
the court's view that the shopping center is a "favorable" solicitation
site.172 While conceding that considerations under the United States
Constitution appear to be neutral, the court looked to the Pruneyard
decision as authority to grant free speech, free assembly, or electoral
activity on private property that is held open to the public.' 73 In reach-
ing this decision, the court declined to hold that the state action require-
ment limits the application of Article 9 rights.174
In sum, both these cases and several others' 75 suggest that, where a
private mall issues a broad invitation to the public, that invitation, cou-
pled with an expansive rendering of pertinent state constitution provi-
sions, creates a public forum. Once classified as a public forum, the mall
owner's right to exclude others may be compelled to give way in the face
of explicitly or implicitly superior freedom of expression, solicitation, pe-
tition, assembly, or distribution rights.
On the other hand, state court decisions within a labor context are
more problematic. Consider Bellemead Dev. Corp. v. Schneider.176
There, a New Jersey court examined the expressive claims in a park con-
sisting of six office buildings, several warehouses, a motel, an automobile
dealer, and an athletic club. The owner of the office park sought to en-
join the distribution of leaflets on the grounds that the attempt was a
continuing trespass and a nuisance. 77 In an attempt to resolve this dis-
pute within the "'constitutional equipoise between expressional rights
and property rights,' "178 the court found that, under the United States
Constitution, the union members could be barred from distributing leaf-
lets while on private property. However, noting that the New Jersey
170. Id. at 215.
171. Batchelder, 445 N.E2d at 595-96.
172. 1d at 595.
173. Il at 592.
174. Id. at 593.
175. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); State v. Dameron, 853
P.2d 1285 (Or. 1993).
176. 472 A.2d 170 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983), aff'd, 483 A.2d 830 (N.J. 1984).
177. Id. at 173.
178. Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub
noma, Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982)).
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Supreme Court had interpreted the New Jersey constitution more
broadly than the federal constitution, the court concluded that a sliding
scale standard was necessary in order to strike the requisite balance be-
tween private property interests and expressional claims. The court held
that the facts in the instant case showed that the property owners dis-
couraged public use of their property and that the owner extended a
rather limited invitation to the public to use the property. Accordingly,
based on the balancing of factors, 79 it found the union's distribution of
leaflets constituted a continuing trespass which could be enjoined.'
In sum, appending freedom of expression analysis to nonemployee
union distribution and access claims within a labor law context has not
been met with open arms. To the contrary, there seems to be a tendency
to deny nonemployee union organizers freedom of expression claims,
thus requiring resort to the NLRA itself as the basis for nonemployee
union access to private property.
C. The Call for New Legislative, New Statutory, and New Common-
Law Property Rights Definitions
The general reluctance of courts to expand access has sparked a
growing call for explicit pro-union legislation,' 8' which would redistrib-
ute power in favor of employees, while diminishing the power of land
owners and employers. While some advocates of expanded access focus
on federal legislation,182 other commentators argue that the deployment
of state legislatures in the exercise of their regulating power and state
courts in their common-law tradition, constitutes a fruitful arena for pro-
gress. 83 In the next section, consistent with the public choice view, I
consider: 1) the risk of error and disorder implicit in state-sponsored
adoptions of property rights redefinitions in a labor access context; 2)
the likelihood that narrow special interest groups benefit from these new
179. The court looked to a three part test which requires that the court review:
(1) the nature, purpose and primary use of such private property, generally its normal
use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use the property, and (3) the
purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both
the private and public use of the property.
Id at 174 (citing Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630). Interestingly, the court found the purpose of
speech-promoting unionization-to be inconsistent with the defendant union's access
claims. In other words, the decision was solely premised on speech. Id. at 177.
180. Id at 177.
181. See Estlund, supra note 4; see also Summers, supra note 8 (calling for broadened
statutory interpretations favoring access to private property by nonemployees).
182. See generally Estlund, supra note 4, at 353-55.
183. Berger, supra note 8, at 636.
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property right definitions; and 3) recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in
the property rights arena.
IV. TowARDS A PUBLIC CHOICE EXAMINATION OF NONEMPLOYEE
ACCESS CLAIMS
"The fact of scarcity, which exists everywhere, guarantees that people
will compete for resources. Markets are one way to organize and chan-
nel this competition. Politics is another. People use both markets and
politics to get resources allocated to the ends they favor."'18 Political
activity is quite distinct from voluntary exchange in markets. 8 5
While democracy allows groups to accomplish many things politically
which might be impossible in the private sector,8 6 it is also true that the
"incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities is directly proportional to
the ease with which the political process can be used for personal...
gain at the expense of others."'187 Accordingly, consistent with the public
choice view, it is time to 1) consider the possibility of the risk of error,
disorder, and confusion when individuals seek, consistent with the new
theory'" of property, to vitiate private property rights in an effort to
expand nonemployee union access claims; 2) determine whether the re-
distribution of property rights favors the narrow special interest as op-
posed to the interest of the larger community; and 3) review recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the private property context.
A. The Possibility of Error and Disorder
Advocates of coherence in the discipline called labor law, especially
those who favor expansive nonemployee access to private property, ab-
hor inconsistency. i 9 Accordingly, in this subsection, an examination of
expanded nonemployee rights with concurrently diminished private
property rights is required. The primary focus of this subsection is
within the context of union nonemployees who seek access to private
property, but it is also important to note that Pruneyard, the preeminent
example of the Supreme Court's acceptance of state-sponsored expan-
184. Richard L. Stroup, Political Behavior, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOM-
ics 45 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Repre-
sentative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONsTTrUTIONAL ECONOMICS 22 (James D.
Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988).
188. See Pilon, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
189. See Kare, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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sion of access claims, occurs outside of a labor law context. Addition-
ally, it is precisely the Pruneyard invitation which has spawned much of
the argument for the new theory of private property.
1. Supreme Court Decision Making and Coherence
In reviewing Supreme Court decisions in the arena of access to pri-
vate property, it is difficult to find either consistency or coherence. As
the following chart demonstrates, the Supreme Court has permitted ac-
cess to private property pursuant to the California Constitution, allowed
labor picketing pursuant to the United States Constitution, granted ac-
cess to prevent anti-union discrimination, and admitted political activi-
ties, including distribution of literature by employees when merely
tangentially related to the employer in issue; notwithstanding, the Court
has also disallowed handbilling by Vietnam War protesters and pre-
cluded nonemployee union access pursuant to the NLRA.
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In sum, the Supreme Court decisionmaking has been neither consistent
nor ordered.
2. Hypothetical Case Development
In light of this demonstrable inconsistency by the United States
Supreme Court in the arena of access claims, the question to be con-
fronted is whether expanding nonemployee union access, that is pre-
mised on state legislative or state constitutional interpretation, assists or
deters coherence. Accordingly, it is necessary to deploy hypothetical
cases in order to determine whether trivializing the right to exclude indi-
viduals and groups from private property, while simultaneously ex-
panding nonemployee free exercise claims, increases the risk of error
and confusion or whether coherence triumphs.
Case I: Nonunion, Nonemployee Exercise of Freedom of Expression
a) A nonemployee, nonunion group seeks to demonstrate, gather peti-
tions, distribute handbills, or to otherwise vindicate their asserted free-
dom of expression rights within a public area of a shopping mall.
b) Consistent with Pruneyard, such asserted free-exercise rights are
guaranteed either explicitly or implicitly by the pertinent state
constitution.
c) Implicit in "b" is the assumption that the property owner's right to
exclude is trivial.
d) In a case brought before the United States Supreme Court, the access
claims of this nonunion, nonemployee group are upheld in a decision
which is in accord with Pruneyard.
Case 11- Union Nonemployee Exercise Claims Involving an Employer
with Employment Locations in Two States
a) A nonemployee union group, as part of an organizational and recog-
nitional campaign, engages in a program of picketing which includes
handbilling within the public access areas of employer-owned shopping
malls located in the states of Libby and McKay. The union seeks to
persuade mall employees to support the union as their bargaining
representative.
b) A valid election covering mall employees under Section 9(c) of the
NLRA has been held during the past six-month period. 19°
190. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988).
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c) 1) The State of McKay does not have any state statute, constitutional
provision, or constitutional interpretation granting access to shopping
malls when exercising putative freedom of expression rights.
2) The State of Libby, consistent with Pruneyard, allows access to
privately owned shopping malls pursuant to the state court's interpreta-
tion of pertinent provisions of the State of Libby's constitution.
d) The employer threatens the union with state court action and eject-
ment. Then the employer ejects nonemployee union organizers from
malls located in both states.
e) Possible decisions include:
1) State Court Decisions
(a) In a case brought by the union in Libby, the Supreme Court of
the State of Libby, applying the Sears Roebuck doctrine, decides that
federal preemption is inapplicable. Accordingly, the Court allows
nonemployee union access consistent with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Pruneyard. As such, ejectment by the
employer is invalidated;191
(b) In a case brought in McKay by the union claiming that the eject-
ment should be disallowed, the Supreme Court of the State of Mc-
Kay, applying the Sears Roebuck doctrine, decides federal
preemption does not apply. Accordingly, since the organizers vio-
lated state trespass laws, the employer's ejectment is upheld.192
2) NLRB Decisions
(a) In a case brought by the union in the State of McKay, before the
NLRB, the Board decides that the employer did not engage in an
unfair labor practice violation of the NLRA by ejecting the nonem-
ployee union organizers because a valid election' 93 was held within
191. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court held that neither arguable section seven claims nor argua-
bly prohibited conduct preempts the application of state trespass law. The locus of the picket-
ing in Sears Roebuck was likely unprotected by the NLRA, however, the conduct apart from
the location might be protected. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text. Here, how-
ever, the hypothetical presents conduct which itself is likely to be prohibited by Section
8(b)(7) of the act. See 29 U.S.C.§ 158(b)(7) (1988).
192. This decision follows the holding in Sears, Roebuck in deciding that federal preemp-
tion of the application of state trespass law is unwarranted. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436
U.S. at 190-98.
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (stating that a union commits an unfair labor practice by
engaging in organizational picketing where the employees participated in a valid election
within the last twelve months).
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the past six months. This decision, in effect, validates the ejectment
by the employer.
(b) In a case brought by the employer in the State of Libby, the
NLRB finds that the nonemployee union organizing activities violate
Section 8 (b)(7) of NLRA. But then the NLRB decides that state
law controls access to private property. Under applicable state law,
nonemployee union organizers are allowed to continue to picket on
private property.
4) Analysis: Employer with locations in two states confronts la-
bor access rules which vary by application of state law.
Case III: Nonunion, Nonemployee Free Exercise and Concurrent
Union, Nonemployee Free Exercise Claim
a) A nonemployee, nonunion group distributes handbills within a public
area of a privately owned shopping mali located in the State of Libby.
b) Such free exercise rights are guaranteed, consistent with Pruneyard,
either explicitly or implicitly by the state constitution.
c) Consistent with Pruneyard, the mall owner allows access to this non-
union group.
d) A nonemployee union group, as part of an organizational and recog-
nitional campaign, engages in picketing and handbilling within the public
access areas of the employer-owned mall. The union seeks to persuade
mall employees to join the union.
e) The mall owner threatens state court action and disallows union ac-
cess on grounds that federal preemption rules preclude nonemployee la-
bor organizer access claims under state law and requires instead that
their rights be determined exclusively under the NLRA.
f) Consistent with the teaching of Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere,
other access alternatives exist.
g) Possible decisions include:
1) In a case before the Supreme Court of Libby, the court, consistent
with Pruneyard, allows access;
2) On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court,
animated by its belief that, among other things, uniformity, the doc-
trine of federal preemption, and the primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB to resolve labor disputes, disallows access consistent with
Garmon. This view accepts the notion that the union's conduct falls
within the arguably protected, arguably prohibited category;
3) The union then pursues its access claim before the NLRB. The
NLRB, consistent with Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere, finds that
sufficient alternative channels for pro-union communication exist
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and, accordingly, denies the union access claim, as the activity is not
protected by the NLRA. In addition to its access claims, however,
the union also claims that the employer committed an unfair labor
practice by engaging in discrimination against the union. Accord-
ingly, consistent with Stowe, the NLRB determines that the mall
owner's refusal to allow nonemployee union distribution constitutes
an unfair labor practice. Hence, the employer's refusal is invalidated.
Assuredly, this rather short list of hypotheticals fails to exhaust all of
the possibilities, permutations, or decisions. These hypotheticals, how-
ever, demonstrate that expanding nonemployee access through state law
trivialization of property is successful in increasing the risk of error, dis-
order, inconsistency, and conflict. As one of the leading advocates of
expanded labor access rights conceded, "[T]he conflict ... arises (and
will now arise more frequently) when a state permits labor activity on
private property where, under Lechmere, that activity is not protected by
the NLRA."'194
3. Recent NLRB Decisions
In reality, the NLRB has considered rather directly the essential con-
flict between state-sponsored access expansions and private property
rights. In two recent California cases,19 5 the NLRB held that, "by virtue
of the state constitutional rights recognized in Pruneyard, an employer
could not exclude area standards picketers from the sidewalk of a strip
shopping center. ' 19 6 Accordingly, the employer in issue "thus violated
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by ejecting the union agents from [their]
property."' 97 Assuredly, incorporating state law into Section 7 analysis
makes "[t]he actual freedom to exercise section 7 rights varies dramati-
cally from state to state, from the minimal access rights enunciated in
Lechmere, to the more generous access rights recognized in several
states."'19 If uncompensated access to private property is granted to la-
bor organizers, or to those exercising freedom of expression rights based
on state law as opposed to the NLRA, the question becomes whether a
private property owner can deny access to anyone, no matter how hostile
194. Estlund, supra note 4, at 339.
195. Bristol Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. 437,439 (1993); Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc. and
United Food and Commercial Workers, 311 N.L.R.B. 678, 679 (1993).
196. Estlund, supra note 4, at 341.
197. Id
198. Id But see Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the state statute exempting labor activity from state trespass laws is preempted
by NLRA).
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that claimant is to the property owner's interest. As the recent record of
NLRB cases demonstrates, variability, conflict, and incoherence are the
touchstones of state-sponsored access claims. The additional question is
whether freedom itself must also become a casualty of this new theory of
property.
B. Will State Legislated or Sponsored Redistributions of Property
Rights Favor the Narrow Special Interest or the Interest of the
Larger Community?
"Politics is a structure of complex exchange among individuals, a
structure within which persons seek to secure collectively their own pri-
vately defined objectives that can not be efficiently secured through sim-
ple market exchanges."' 99 To repeat, it is robustly argued that Lechmere
and Babcock & Wilcox embody an "unduly broad conception of private
property rights."2 ° Accordingly, commentators have suggested that
property rights be redistributed to labor and other groups either through
state-sponsored legislation, or judicial interpretation of state constitu-
tions, or through statutory or judicial reconceptions of the NLRA.2 10
Before continuing the development of a public choice explanation of
attempts to expand nonemployee union access rights and hence enlarge
union power, it is useful to examine briefly 1) the returns to labor, and 2)
the economic effects of labor unions on income distribution. This is es-
pecially useful since public choice theory is an economic theory of
legislation.
1) Economic Background
Few ideas are so deeply engrained in the minds of most people in
the Western world as that labor unions have been beneficial to
those whose main incomes derive from the sale of labor services.
Labor unions are popularly credited with all, or most, of the im-
provements in real wages and working conditions that workers
have enjoyed in the last 100 years.2 02
The federal government, by enacting the NLRA, "has granted labor car-
tels [unions] legal immunities and privileges. 2 °3  Government protec-
tion of cartels should lead to above-market wages, reduced efficiency
199. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 103, 107.
200. Estlund, supra note 4, at 343.
201. See Berger, supra note 8, at 633; see also Kare, supra note 6, at 7.
202. Charles W. Baird, Foreword, to W.H. Hurr, THE THEORY OF CouLLrivE BAR-
GAINING 1930-1974 at xi (1980).
203. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 3.
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and the creation of economic rents." 4 While the meaning of available
empirical evidence is the subject of some dispute, it seems clear that:
a) "Issues associated with labor market rents almost certainly dwarf
those associated with monopoly rents earned by capitalists; '205
b) Some studies suggest that the union wage premium ranges from
sixteen to thirty percent above the earnings of similarly skilled non-
union workers;20 6
c) Monopoly wages earned by unionized labor "lower national out-
put due to sub-optimal employment of labor and capital. '20 7 The net
result of the economic rents imposed on the nonunion sectors is
eighty billion dollars or two percent of the GNP;2 °
d) The economic rents collected by unions results in unemployed or
underemployed workers, who receive incomes substantially lower
than the average U.S. wage.20 9
In short, while it has been argued that nurturing labor union traditions
moves society towards "egalitarianism and solidarity, '210 in reality the
economic record suggests that "[tio the extent that unions are successful,
they redistribute income toward their members, who are predominately
white, male, and well paid, at the expense of consumers as a whole, tax-
204. See generally id. at 2-122. For an illustration of above market wages, inefficiency, and
economic rent creation accruing to labor in an international trade context, see Harry G.
Hutchison, Distributional Consequences, Policy Implications of Voluntary Export Restraints on
Textiles and Appare Stee; and Automobiles, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1757 (1992).
205. See Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, Industry Rents: Evidence and Impli-
cations, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Acrivrry: MiCROECONOMIcs 209-10 (1988).
(suggesting that capital owners in the United States economy receive few monopoly [eco-
nomic] rents. Most rents, perhaps 80-85%, went to labor).
206. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 73; see also RIcHARD K. VEDDAR & LOWELL E. GAL-
LWAY, OuT OF WORK (1993). Historical analysis of wage differentials between the unionized
sector and nonunion sector shows that prior to 1933 the differentiation hovered at about 5 or
6% and then rose almost continuously in the late thirties, reaching 23% by 1941. "Formal
statistical tests of these trends indicate a substantial change in the pattern of behavior of the
union-nonunion wage differential commencing at approximately the time the nation's basic
policy with respect to trade unions shifted from ... toleration to ... encouragement." REYN-
OLDS, supra note 3, at 139. But see Dale Belman, Unions, the Quality of Labor Relations, and
Firm Performance, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETIvWNESs 41 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula
B. Voos eds., 1992).
207. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 80.
208. See id. at 84.
209. Id. at 65-84.
210. See Klare, supra note 6; at 2.
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payers, nonunion workers, and the unemployed-groups with lower av-
erage incomes than union members." 21 '
2. The Public Choice View of Expanded Nonemployee Access Rights
An "important goal of a legal system that desires to promote social
stability and social welfare is to increase the transaction costs facing par-
ties who seek enactment of legislation that would employ the machinery
of the state to effect coercive wealth transfers from one group to an-
other. '212 To be sure, most proposals to expand nonemployee union ac-
cess specifically, as well as proposals to expand nonemployee access
generally, are not premised explicitly on income redistribution. To the
contrary, such proposals are grounded on, among other things: 1) the
importance of an informed, politically conscious electorate; 213 2) the
needs of employees and the common good;214 and 3) the need to expand
and enhance workplace democracy by increasing opportunities for em-
ployees to learn the benefits of collective bargaining.21 5
Generally, advocates of expanded access claim that the owners' pre-
sumptive right to exclude must give way .to other important interests.216
However appealing these claims may be, "we cannot simply take for
granted that... [legislation] represents the public interest. Realistically,
we must also consider the possibility that a statute represents private
rather than public interests because of the undue influence of special
interest groups. '217 We must confront the possibility that either a stat-
ute, a proposed statute, or a judicial reinterpretation simply represents
an attractive vehicle for creative and coercive wealth and power
transfers.218
Legislative proposals for expanded access to private property are
premised on the view that the state has the right to place conditions
211. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 29; see also THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MrNoRI-
TIEs 110 (1981) (rise of government supported labor unions used to constrain black
employment).
212. Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public
Choice ModeL- An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471,472 (1988). Ad-
ditionally, even the possibility of coercive transfers reduces the wealth of society. Id.
213. Berger, supra note 8, at 635.
214. Estlund, supra note 4, at 359.
215. Klare, supra note 6, at 45-46.
216. Estlund, supra note 4, at 346.
217. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 1; see also Macey, supra note 212, at 477
(suggesting that because of the possibility of undue influence, the role of the legal systems is
not simply to restrain interest groups, but also to serve as a filter that discards legislation
which is simply redistributive).
218. See generally BERRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHics oF REDISTRIBUTION (1990).
[Vol. 78:1
NONEMPLOYEE UNION ACCESS CLAIMS
upon the "owner's right to admit or exclude, or to insist that if A is
admitted to the property then B must be admitted."21 9 On the other
hand, as advocates of expanded nonemployee access concede, the inci-
dents of property ownership-such as what one can do with it or what
one can prevent others from doing with it-affect the property's
value.1 °0 Furthermore, a principal conception of property "embraces the
absolute right to exclude."'" Accordingly, restrictions upon "exclusive
possession of land constitute a partial taking."'  While it seems clear
that restricting a property owner's right to exclude may constitute a tak-
ing, an analysis of the empirical data is required in order to determine
whether such redistributions of property rights favor the narrow or the
public interest.
Efforts aimed at increasing nonemployee union access are, in es-
sence, attempts to expand the size of the unionized sector of the econ-
omy.l Because 1) the union sector is relatively small, 2) union wage
premia exceed wages of similarly skilled nonunion workers, 3) monopoly
wages earned by the unionized sector increase unemployment, and 4)
the labor market itself receives most of the economic rents that the econ-
omy generates, it is difficult to conclude that legislative proposals ex-
panding access and restricting the right to exclude favor the larger
national interest. This is especially true in light of the substantial schol-
arship which demonstrates that "[t]he creation of exclusive rights is a
necessary... condition for the efficient use of resources," 4 and that
"the right to exclude others may promote economic productivity...
which may benefit the whole society."2'
Action to expand nonemployee access within the context of a union
organizing, recognitional, or area standards campaign cannot be seen as
a redistribution of income from the "richer to the poorer... [but as] a
redistribution of power from the individual to the state." 6 Such legisla-
tive or judicial action benefits a relatively small, relatively affluent spe-
cial interest group, while placing at risk improved productivity and
efficiency, which benefits society as a whole. Therefore, policies which
solely benefit unions cannot be seen as benefitting the larger interest. In
219. EpsTEIN, supra note 153, at 65.
220. Klare, supra note 6, at 20.
221. EPSTnIN, supra note 153, at 65.
222. Id.
223. See generally Kare, supra note 6; Estlund, supra note 4.
224. RicIARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 33 (4th ed. 1992).
225. Estlund, supra note 4, at 344-45.
226. DE JOUVENEL, supra note 218, at 72.
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light of the unions' declining share of the labor market, expanded non-
employee access proposals and legislation emerge as an effort by govern-
ment "to insulate well-established interest groups from the negative
side-effects of economic change. '2 2 7
However defined, explicated, or analyzed, proposals for enlarging
nonemployee access through uncompensated extirpation of private
property rights can be seen as simply an attempt to deploy the coercive
power of the state in order to achieve a wealth transfer. To repeat, con-
sistent with public choice theory, such attempts are a vehicle by which
"persons seek to secure collectively their own privately defined objec-
tives that cannot be efficiently secured through simple market ex-
changes."'  In addition, and consistent with the public choice view,
applying this new theory of property to restrict the right to exclude in-
creases the risk of error, disorder, and confusion.
C. The Right to Exclude: Recent Supreme Court Decision-Making
In a recently issued opinion, the United States Supreme Court con-
tinued a trend2 2 9 that requires stricter scrutiny of state restrictions on
private property. Such a trend implicates the viability of state and feder-
ally sponsored nonemployee access expansions. In Dolan v. City of
Tigard,23 ° the city planning commission conditioned approval of Dolan's
application to expand her store upon the dedication of some of her land
for a public greenway and floodplain along a creek and for a pedestrian!
bicycle pathway intended to relieve traffic congestion. Citing Armstrong
with approval, the Court said that one of the principal purposes of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion is to prevent government from forcing some people to bear public
burdens alone.2 3' Moreover, granting public access would deprive Do-
lan "of the right to exclude others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' ",232 To
be fair, the Court also stated that "[a] land use regulation does not effect
a taking if it 'substantially advances legitimate state interests' and does
not 'deny an owner economically viable use of his land.' "233 Restating
227. John Gray, Introduction to id. at xviii.
228. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 108.
229. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
230. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
231. Id. at 2316.
232. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
233. Id. (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980)).
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its adherence to the essential nexus standard of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,3 4 the Court also determined that "a use restriction
may constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of
a substantial government purpose. '235 Noting that Dolan had already
left fifteen percent of her property as open space, an amount sufficient
for the floodplain, the Court found that Dolan's loss of the ability to
exclude was dispositive, and thus reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's
decision which had upheld the city restrictions.2 6 In essence, the United
States Supreme Court found that the uncompensated vitiation of the
right to exclude constitutes an uncompensated taking.
This and several other decisions23 7 indicate that the Supreme Court is
beginning to take the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment seriously.
Moreover, these cases suggest that the Court once again believes the
right to exclude must be preserved as part of the bundle of private prop-
erty rights. The implications of this view for nonemployee union access
claims will be more fully addressed in the next section.
V. TowARDs COHERENCE
A. Towards a Coherent View of State-Sponsored Expansions Of
Nonemployee Union Access Claims
As section IV and subsections A, B, and C illustrate, developing co-
herent and consistent standards for access to private property seems
quite difficult. Disorder and inconsistency are the hallmarks of cases de-
cided in the area.
Access claims can be a function of employment, free exercise of free-
dom expression, and labor law itself. More specifically, if one looks at
state-sponsored expansions of freedom of expression rights acquired
through uncompensated vitiations of the right to exclude, it seems clear
that such expansions have the capability of increasing the risk that the
NLRA goal of uniformity will be undermined. While attempts by states
to regulate labor law directly have been disallowed, 38 it is also clear that
indirect efforts which regulate labor law, including state-sponsored ex-
pansion of access premised on freedom of expression claims, are also
capable of varying the application of the NLRA.
234. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
235. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.
236. 11 at 2314.
237. See, eg., Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886.
238. See ag., Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991).
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In Bristol Fans2 39 and Payless Drug Stores,240 the right of nonem-
ployee union agents to engage in picketing and handbilling on privately
owned lands was upheld by the NLRB. The Board declined to apply
Lechmere and reversed decisions by the administrative law judge in both
cases. Instead, relying on Pruneyard, the Board upheld the right of pick-
eters to use privately owned (but leased) property in an effort to dis-
suade customers from shopping at the Bristol Farms store or the Payless
store. While such picketing and handbilling cannot reasonably be re-
lated to the economic interest of the employer, the NLRB held that it
lacked authority under California law to prevent the picketing because
property rights were a function of state law, not federal law. Accord-
ingly, by prohibiting nonemployees from picketing or handbilling, activi-
ties directly inimical to its interests, the employer violated Section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. In essence, the NLRB determined that in these
decisions it is authorized to ignore applicable federal decisions such as
Lechmere and, instead, can decide such cases based on state law.
On the other hand, in cases in which a state, by immunizing labor
activity from state trespass law, explicitly interferes with labor law, the
state law will likely be disallowed.241 The inference to be drawn, if Bris-
tol Farms and Payless are allowed to stand, is that the state can change
the parameters of federal labor law so long as it enacts generally-as
opposed to specifically-applicable rules. Indeed, this is precisely what
some advocates of expanded access envision.
To the contrary, I argue that if coherence and uniformity are to be
attained, reinvigorated federal preemption rules should be deployed
when considering an activity arguably protected under Section 7 of the
NLRA or arguably prohibited under Section 8 of the NLRA. The Con-
gress of the United States should give life to the principles of uniformity
in order to explicitly oust both general and specific state regulation of
conduct where strangers picket, handbill or otherwise come onto private
lands. The Congress should amend the NLRA to require that the
NLRB, Federal and State courts preempt the application of state laws
that make the freedom to exercise Section 7 rights vary from state to
state. Such an approach will increase coherence and reduce variability.
239. 311 N.L.R.B. 437 (1993); see also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM
(1993) (arguing that Lechmere should be overturned).
240. 311 N.L.R.B. 678 (1993).
241. See generally Rum Creek, 926 F.2d 353.
[Vol. 78:1
NONEMPLOYEE UNION ACCESS CLAIMS
B. Towards a Principled Nonemployee Access and Property Rights
View
Expanded nonemployee union access benefits rent-seeking special
interests-comprised of relatively affluent individuals-at the expense
of the larger interest. Accordingly, it is time to deploy our limited re-
sources in an effort to "control the temptation of elected officials to sac-
rifice principle for partisanship."242 The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution applied to the states provides, in pertinent part: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." 3 Words, to be sure, are capable of several meanings. Accord-
ingly, developing a principled definition of private property is a priority
in bringing long-term coherence to the Pruneyard. Property does not
"lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited
to use it for designated purposes, [and] ... [t]he essentially private char-
acter of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not
change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a mod-
em shopping center."2 " Despite that conclusion, the United States
Supreme Court, in Pruneyard, stated that its reasoning in Lloyd does.not
"ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitu-
tion."'245 While 1) conceding that a state "may adopt reasonable restric-
tions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a
taking without just compensation," 246 and 2) conceding that "one of the
essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude
others,"'247 the Supreme Court, in a decision riven with inconsistency,
focused on whether the access claims of the students in Pruneyard so
substantially impair the "economic value of [the] property"24 as to con-
stitute a taking. As Epstein forcefully illumines:
In private cases no injunction against entry is dependent upon
showing actual damages. The entry itself is the violation of the
right, for which the injunction is available for redress, even if no
damages can or should be awarded. It therefore follows that any
242. Macey, supra note 212, at 473.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
244. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972)).
245. Id. at 81.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 82.
248. Id. at 84.
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demonstration about the negligible impairment... is wholly be-
side point ....249
Whatever the status of nonemployee access seekers, the Pruneyard
shopping mall issued no invitation to the signature solicitors.2 0 Accord-
ingly, state restrictions placed on exclusive possession of private prop-
erty constitute a partial taking for which compensation is required."5'
While one leading advocate of broadened nonemployee access argues
that the Pruneyard decision gives rise to the claim that once an employer
opens his property to outsiders, it becomes less than truly "private prop-
erty, ''252 Epstein demonstrates that "private property gives the right to
exclude others without the need for any justification. ''253
Therefore, improved coherence requires a revitalization of the dis-
tinction between private and public property. This revitalization would
allow states and the federal government to engage in property redefini-
tions only where compensation is forthcoming. It follows, therefore, that
a commitment to coherence requires the withdrawal of Pruneyard's invi-
tation to reinterpret, amend or otherwise expand nonemployee access
rights without compensation.
As one observer notes:
An individual who attempts to capture a given property right has
three options. First, he can negotiate to buy the right from its
owner in a voluntary private exchange.. Second, the individual
may get the government to seize the right from its present owner
and reassign it to him. Finally, the individual can resort to theft
.... When the government is brought into the game of capturing
and reassigning property rights, opportunities for the political ma-
nipulation of rights arise. Rent-seeking activities of that sort in-
volve attempts by interest groups to "define, reassign, modify, or
attenuate property rights." 4
Uncompensated expansions of nonemployee access to private property
can be seen as an effort by special interest groups to redistribute prop-
erty rights as part of the new theory of property. Consistent with the
public choice view, action which redistributes property rights to a rela-
tively small, relatively affluent, special interest group cannot satisfy that
249. EpSmIN, supra note 153, at 65.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Estlund, supra note 4, at 353.
253. EPsTIn , supra note 153, at 66.
254. John M. Mbaku, Property Rights and Rent Seeking in South Africa, 11 CATO JOUR-
NAL 135, 138 (1991) (quoting Bruce L. Benson, Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspec-
tive, 5 S. ECON. J. 398 (1984)).
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which is a collective need." 5 Such efforts should, accordingly, be disal-
lowed. Coherence and the larger interest require that the United States
Supreme Court expand its decision in Tigard, reaffirming the property
owner's right to exclude and overturn Pruneyard itself. 56
CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the NLRA, courts, legislatures, the National
Labor Relations Board, and commentators have all confronted the issue
of nonemployee union access to private property. While some United
States Supreme Court decisions have stated that Babcock & Wilcox and
its progeny have struck the right balance, many commentators argue-
and some NLRB decisions imply-that courts have too frequently en-
gaged in constrained decisionmaking that eviscerates the goals of collec-
tive bargaining, workplace democracy, "egalitarianism" and "solidarity."
Since Pruneyard, states increasingly have been called upon to confront
poignant claims for enlarged access to private property based on free-
dom of expression rights. Unsurprisingly, many labor commentators,
state courts, and some NLRB decisions have seized upon putative free-
dom of expression rights as a vehicle 1) to restrict property owners' right
to exclude and 2) to enhance the "common good". To the contrary, pub-
lic choice analysis indicates that the common good and the larger inter-
est are not served by uncompensated expansions of nonemployee access.
Public choice examination suggests that, as our laws and legal institu-
tions embrace expanded nonemployee access, the likelihood of .error,
confusion, and incoherence rise. Moreover, since exclusive possession
increases efficiency and productivity, restricting the right to exclude has
a negative effect on the larger interest while, assuredly, regressively re-
distributing benefits in favor of a small, relatively affluent special interest
group at the expense of groups such as nonunion workers, unemployed
workers, consumers, and taxpayers who are relatively less affluent.
This, of course, reaffirms the quintessential public choice conclusion
that the "relevant difference between markets and politics does not lie in
the kinds of values/interests that persons pursue but in the conditions
under which they pursue their various interests.' '257 Accordingly, re-
stricting property owners' rights to exclude can be seen as a "blatant
255. DENNis C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOIcE I 109 (1989).
256. See BniRNARD H. SmGA., ECONocC LIBERTS AD THE CONS T ON 318-31 (ar-
guing for reinterpretation of the Due Process Clause to safeguard economic liberties including
property ights).
257. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 107.
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injustice."258 While it is perhaps chimerical to believe that advocates of
expanded access will be concerned by this "injustice," the United States
Supreme Court, by deploying a principled conception of private prop-
erty rights precluding uncompensated takings of the right to exclude, can
return justice, equity, and coherence to the Pruneyard, and thereby en-
hance the common good.
258. J.G. KNur WICKSELL, FINANZTHEORETISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN 89 (1896).
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